Consumerism, authenticity and African communalism
- Smook, E https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4226-6029
- Authors: Smook, E https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4226-6029
- Date: 2022-09
- Subjects: Consumption (Economics) , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Philosophy, African
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10353/23958 , vital:62022
- Description: Let me state, from the outset, that the issues raised below may be considered from various vantage points – Capitalism, Marxism, etc. However, this thesis is an endeavour to account for the loss of authenticity due to the most salient features of the consumer paradigm, which is the manufactured object, the production line and the proliferation of said objects. True relationships, or shall we say authentic dialogue, is based upon a difference of viewpoints – or epistemic distance – between the interlocutors. This difference of opinion, it may be argued, allows for a cognitive jostling between the subjects involved and represents, as it were, the reciprocal back and forth movement of ideas that betokens actively engaged dialogue. Crucial, then, to true, and by extension authentic, relationships is an epistemic distance steeped in variegated, heterogeneous points of view. For it is in sharing the differences in our points of view or interpretations of the world that we may start a dialogue far removed from each other and then sustain said dialogue in an attempt to reconcile our differences. The continuation of the dialogue, then, depends upon difference. Without the latter difference, the conditions of true dialogue, which is also a marker of authentic relationships, the need for sustained debate is forfeited and the dialogue ceases to serve a purpose – for the subjects involved in the intellectual jostling and exchange of ideas may already anticipate the thoughts of the other. In so anticipating the thoughts of the other, what is brought to the fore is not the ideas of the other, and by extension the other’s existence distinct from mine, but rather my own existence and thoughts. Were I and the other to share a constellation of beliefs, I am left with only that which I already believe in and so only with my own thoughts. The other’s differing opinion is crucial to their appearing to me as an element discreet and distinct from me. For if the other’s being is in essence of the same ilk as mine – and with that I mean if the other’s points of view and adopted systems of praxis mirror mine – we are like trees in a forest. The existence of collective nouns attests to this latter remark; we are prone to see the forest, not the similar trees that constitute it. Now the question arises as to the constitution of the self; what is it that makes up the character and nature of a person and how, if at all, may subjects be said to differ epistemically? According to Sartre, the ego is a transcendent object for consciousness, meaning that it exists out there in the world just like other objects. This is the case because consciousness is essentially empty. Recall Sartre’s famous claim that existence precedes essence, which in turn means that consciousness, or the ego, is filled up inchmeal with contents outside itself. In other words, that with which we are engaged constitutes the contents of consciousness. Repeated exposure to certain objects, or phenomena, brings about the cultivation of states and qualities – these, as it were, constituting the ego in the end. Moreover, these states and qualities, as arisen from repeated exposure to like phenomena, will instil in the subject a certain proclivity for a certain manner of action under specific conditions. As such, having been presented with something disagreeable many times over, a state of repulsion might gain a foothold in my ego regarding the phenomenon in question. This in turn will dictate how I act in the presence of said phenomenon or any other phenomena that include, adumbrationally, some of the qualities of the original phenomenon. As such, then, my actions are reflections of the states that I experience in the presence of certain objects or phenomena and, it may be argued, reflexively represent the world around me as that which constitutes my ego. The facticity of the world, then, has a great bearing upon the manner in which I perceive and engage the world. However, claims Sartre, facticity is but one side of the coin. The world and its meaning are constituted by what Sartre calls brute meaning. This refers to the fact that meaning is a matter of public opinion and does not precede the phenomenon or object itself – the latter being, in essence, but a bare, pliable, monstrous mass of being-in-itself. Due to this occurrence of meaning being man made, we are in a unique position of freedom. We are, he further claims, capable of transcending these brute meanings, enabling us to avail ourselves of the objects or phenomena in question in a bespoke manner. Freedom to choose how we interact with and interpret the world is thus the ontological ground of choice. We have, on the one side, the world in its undifferentiated state – being-in-itself – and on the other the possibility to give this world a specific meaning in accordance with our intentions – being-for-itself. Freedom to choose, so construed, thus ontologically underlies the very fabric of our existence, hence the claim that we are condemned to be free. Choosing whether to continue along the path set out by our original factual condition or to transcend it and make of it something different altogether is thus not a choice at all, but the obligatory condition of the human condition. Once again, this is the case because consciousness, as per Sartre, is empty to start with and can only be filled with the contents of phenomena or objects in accordance with our intentional engagement of them. However, Sartre continues, this freedom of meaning and the fact that brute existents represent nothing more than the convergence of publicly ascribed meaning awaken in the subject a certain nausea – a nausea born of the fact that we, the people, are at every junction in a position where we have to choose the meaning of life. Determinism, thusly, does not exist and we are not only free to choose the meanings of our own lives, but are responsible for what our lives become. This realisation proves to be too much for most to stomach and leads them along a specific path of choice: over-identification with either their factual realities or with the possibility to transcend the latter. Either way, what they aim to achieve with this overidentification is the suppression of the nauseating reality that reality is nought but what we make it to be and we are thus responsible for what it becomes. Sartre calls this bad faith. Pandering to this proclivity towards bad faith, or alternatively, the propensity for overidentification with either side on the facticity/transcendence dichotomy, we find consumerism. The consumer paradigm delineates happiness as an objective ideal, attainable through the acquisition of specific markers of demonstrable happiness. At the same time, it also provides an answer to the nauseating reality that we, humans, are never fully determined beings, but find ourselves vacillating between our factual constraints and our transcendences thereof. It offers us the crystalised means of becoming this or that individual by way of populating our immediate and personal surroundings with signifiers of happiness. Considering, moreover, that a liberalist conception of human being clearly indicates that individuation of each subject is an important aspect of existence, authenticity in terms of rights emerge as a corollary of said individuation. Each individual, so construed, is given the opportunity, the right, to acquire said markers of happiness and individuation. Obtaining these, it may be argued, allows the individual two things: firstly, to quell the nausea that haunts our dualistic lives by concretising it altogether and so doing highlighting the factual side of things; and secondly, to become discreet and individuated subjects, authentic in their beings. However, the authenticity so begotten provides nought but a thin veneer of idiosyncrasy, as the markers of said authenticity are publicly available and so the same for everyone. The problem, thus, of self-individuation is resolved by providing the subject the means of over-identification with their factual realities whilst convincing them, the consumers, that the objects on offer will afford them a degree of happiness and set them apart from their fellow subjects. The unfortunate upshot of this is that subjects all avail themselves of the same set of objects in an attempt to quell the nausea that besets the individual plunged into an undifferentiated existence. We are here at the heart of the matter. Due to the proliferation of like objects throughout the life-world, a specific system of praxis is implied. So as to navigate the life-world and utilise the similar objects that populate it, consumers are driven towards shared ideologies and courses of action. Moreover, their intentions also converge, as they all seek to establish a web of objects around them that would bespeak their individuation and happiness. Where the life-world has become such a homogeneous landscape, it may be argued, in line with Sartrean thought, that the contents of consciousness would also be similar for all. And where the contents of consciousness is similar for all, we may argue that reasoning would be similar for all. It is at this point that dialogue breaks down, for there is nothing epistemically to separate interlocutors and therefore no differences of opinion to sustain true dialogue. If, as it was reasoned some pages prior, it is the case that sustained dialogue provides the predicate upon which authentic relationships are to be based, the collapse of this epistemic distance between consumers must then also lead to a collapse of authentic relationships. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-09
- Authors: Smook, E https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4226-6029
- Date: 2022-09
- Subjects: Consumption (Economics) , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Philosophy, African
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10353/23958 , vital:62022
- Description: Let me state, from the outset, that the issues raised below may be considered from various vantage points – Capitalism, Marxism, etc. However, this thesis is an endeavour to account for the loss of authenticity due to the most salient features of the consumer paradigm, which is the manufactured object, the production line and the proliferation of said objects. True relationships, or shall we say authentic dialogue, is based upon a difference of viewpoints – or epistemic distance – between the interlocutors. This difference of opinion, it may be argued, allows for a cognitive jostling between the subjects involved and represents, as it were, the reciprocal back and forth movement of ideas that betokens actively engaged dialogue. Crucial, then, to true, and by extension authentic, relationships is an epistemic distance steeped in variegated, heterogeneous points of view. For it is in sharing the differences in our points of view or interpretations of the world that we may start a dialogue far removed from each other and then sustain said dialogue in an attempt to reconcile our differences. The continuation of the dialogue, then, depends upon difference. Without the latter difference, the conditions of true dialogue, which is also a marker of authentic relationships, the need for sustained debate is forfeited and the dialogue ceases to serve a purpose – for the subjects involved in the intellectual jostling and exchange of ideas may already anticipate the thoughts of the other. In so anticipating the thoughts of the other, what is brought to the fore is not the ideas of the other, and by extension the other’s existence distinct from mine, but rather my own existence and thoughts. Were I and the other to share a constellation of beliefs, I am left with only that which I already believe in and so only with my own thoughts. The other’s differing opinion is crucial to their appearing to me as an element discreet and distinct from me. For if the other’s being is in essence of the same ilk as mine – and with that I mean if the other’s points of view and adopted systems of praxis mirror mine – we are like trees in a forest. The existence of collective nouns attests to this latter remark; we are prone to see the forest, not the similar trees that constitute it. Now the question arises as to the constitution of the self; what is it that makes up the character and nature of a person and how, if at all, may subjects be said to differ epistemically? According to Sartre, the ego is a transcendent object for consciousness, meaning that it exists out there in the world just like other objects. This is the case because consciousness is essentially empty. Recall Sartre’s famous claim that existence precedes essence, which in turn means that consciousness, or the ego, is filled up inchmeal with contents outside itself. In other words, that with which we are engaged constitutes the contents of consciousness. Repeated exposure to certain objects, or phenomena, brings about the cultivation of states and qualities – these, as it were, constituting the ego in the end. Moreover, these states and qualities, as arisen from repeated exposure to like phenomena, will instil in the subject a certain proclivity for a certain manner of action under specific conditions. As such, having been presented with something disagreeable many times over, a state of repulsion might gain a foothold in my ego regarding the phenomenon in question. This in turn will dictate how I act in the presence of said phenomenon or any other phenomena that include, adumbrationally, some of the qualities of the original phenomenon. As such, then, my actions are reflections of the states that I experience in the presence of certain objects or phenomena and, it may be argued, reflexively represent the world around me as that which constitutes my ego. The facticity of the world, then, has a great bearing upon the manner in which I perceive and engage the world. However, claims Sartre, facticity is but one side of the coin. The world and its meaning are constituted by what Sartre calls brute meaning. This refers to the fact that meaning is a matter of public opinion and does not precede the phenomenon or object itself – the latter being, in essence, but a bare, pliable, monstrous mass of being-in-itself. Due to this occurrence of meaning being man made, we are in a unique position of freedom. We are, he further claims, capable of transcending these brute meanings, enabling us to avail ourselves of the objects or phenomena in question in a bespoke manner. Freedom to choose how we interact with and interpret the world is thus the ontological ground of choice. We have, on the one side, the world in its undifferentiated state – being-in-itself – and on the other the possibility to give this world a specific meaning in accordance with our intentions – being-for-itself. Freedom to choose, so construed, thus ontologically underlies the very fabric of our existence, hence the claim that we are condemned to be free. Choosing whether to continue along the path set out by our original factual condition or to transcend it and make of it something different altogether is thus not a choice at all, but the obligatory condition of the human condition. Once again, this is the case because consciousness, as per Sartre, is empty to start with and can only be filled with the contents of phenomena or objects in accordance with our intentional engagement of them. However, Sartre continues, this freedom of meaning and the fact that brute existents represent nothing more than the convergence of publicly ascribed meaning awaken in the subject a certain nausea – a nausea born of the fact that we, the people, are at every junction in a position where we have to choose the meaning of life. Determinism, thusly, does not exist and we are not only free to choose the meanings of our own lives, but are responsible for what our lives become. This realisation proves to be too much for most to stomach and leads them along a specific path of choice: over-identification with either their factual realities or with the possibility to transcend the latter. Either way, what they aim to achieve with this overidentification is the suppression of the nauseating reality that reality is nought but what we make it to be and we are thus responsible for what it becomes. Sartre calls this bad faith. Pandering to this proclivity towards bad faith, or alternatively, the propensity for overidentification with either side on the facticity/transcendence dichotomy, we find consumerism. The consumer paradigm delineates happiness as an objective ideal, attainable through the acquisition of specific markers of demonstrable happiness. At the same time, it also provides an answer to the nauseating reality that we, humans, are never fully determined beings, but find ourselves vacillating between our factual constraints and our transcendences thereof. It offers us the crystalised means of becoming this or that individual by way of populating our immediate and personal surroundings with signifiers of happiness. Considering, moreover, that a liberalist conception of human being clearly indicates that individuation of each subject is an important aspect of existence, authenticity in terms of rights emerge as a corollary of said individuation. Each individual, so construed, is given the opportunity, the right, to acquire said markers of happiness and individuation. Obtaining these, it may be argued, allows the individual two things: firstly, to quell the nausea that haunts our dualistic lives by concretising it altogether and so doing highlighting the factual side of things; and secondly, to become discreet and individuated subjects, authentic in their beings. However, the authenticity so begotten provides nought but a thin veneer of idiosyncrasy, as the markers of said authenticity are publicly available and so the same for everyone. The problem, thus, of self-individuation is resolved by providing the subject the means of over-identification with their factual realities whilst convincing them, the consumers, that the objects on offer will afford them a degree of happiness and set them apart from their fellow subjects. The unfortunate upshot of this is that subjects all avail themselves of the same set of objects in an attempt to quell the nausea that besets the individual plunged into an undifferentiated existence. We are here at the heart of the matter. Due to the proliferation of like objects throughout the life-world, a specific system of praxis is implied. So as to navigate the life-world and utilise the similar objects that populate it, consumers are driven towards shared ideologies and courses of action. Moreover, their intentions also converge, as they all seek to establish a web of objects around them that would bespeak their individuation and happiness. Where the life-world has become such a homogeneous landscape, it may be argued, in line with Sartrean thought, that the contents of consciousness would also be similar for all. And where the contents of consciousness is similar for all, we may argue that reasoning would be similar for all. It is at this point that dialogue breaks down, for there is nothing epistemically to separate interlocutors and therefore no differences of opinion to sustain true dialogue. If, as it was reasoned some pages prior, it is the case that sustained dialogue provides the predicate upon which authentic relationships are to be based, the collapse of this epistemic distance between consumers must then also lead to a collapse of authentic relationships. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-09
Ethics of climate change: a normative account
- Authors: Afolabi, Abiodun Paul
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Climatic changes Senegal Saint-Louis , Climatic changes Moral and ethical aspects , Cultural property Senegal Saint-Louis , Ethics Senegal Saint-Louis , Applied ethics , Environmental justice Senegal Saint-Louis , Philosophy, African , Normativity (Ethics)
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192864 , vital:45272 , 10.21504/10962/192864
- Description: Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do? This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative.1 Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Langue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Langue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place. The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati2 have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice. Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes it loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change. This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - ‘cultural storm’ was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo. This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations. The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa’s cultural heritage and values. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Afolabi, Abiodun Paul
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Climatic changes Senegal Saint-Louis , Climatic changes Moral and ethical aspects , Cultural property Senegal Saint-Louis , Ethics Senegal Saint-Louis , Applied ethics , Environmental justice Senegal Saint-Louis , Philosophy, African , Normativity (Ethics)
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192864 , vital:45272 , 10.21504/10962/192864
- Description: Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do? This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative.1 Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Langue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Langue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place. The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati2 have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice. Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes it loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change. This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - ‘cultural storm’ was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo. This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations. The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa’s cultural heritage and values. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Prolegomena to ubuntu and any other future South African philosophy
- Authors: Prinsloo, Aidan Vivian
- Date: 2014
- Subjects: Ubuntu (Philosophy) , Political science -- Philosophy , Philosophy, African , Social values -- South Africa , Social values -- South Africa -- Philosophy , Place (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2747 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013092
- Description: In this thesis I consider ubuntu as a metonym for the particularly African features of South African philosophy. Given that Mbembe critiques African philosophy in general as having failed because it has been subsumed under two unreflective political movements in African thought, I consider whether or not the concept of ubuntu escapes his critique. After developing criteria for measuring the success of any philosophical concept, I conclude that ubuntu is unsuccessful. I then identify the political constraints placed on ubuntu that lead to its failure. These constraints arise from having to validate Africa as a place of intellectual worth. Considering the role of place in these constraints, I argue that a far more productive approach to ubuntu (and South African philosophy in general) is to explicitly incorporate this place into our philosophical project. I use the conceptual framework developed by Bruce Janz to provide a systematic account of place that can be used in formulating South African philosophy. I add to Janz, arguing that philosophy is a response to a particular feature of place: the mystery. By incorporating place into ubuntu, I am able to start developing a philosophical concept which can fulfil the political constraints placed on ubuntu without sacrificing its philosophical integrity. I suggest that ubuntu remains an interesting concept primarily because it promises to respond to the fragmentation of the South African place. I conclude by arguing that ubuntu should be used as the basis for a civic religion which responds to the fragmentation of the South African place. This civic religion will give rise to a significantly distinct philosophical tradition which should not succumb to Mbembe’s critique.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2014
- Authors: Prinsloo, Aidan Vivian
- Date: 2014
- Subjects: Ubuntu (Philosophy) , Political science -- Philosophy , Philosophy, African , Social values -- South Africa , Social values -- South Africa -- Philosophy , Place (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2747 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013092
- Description: In this thesis I consider ubuntu as a metonym for the particularly African features of South African philosophy. Given that Mbembe critiques African philosophy in general as having failed because it has been subsumed under two unreflective political movements in African thought, I consider whether or not the concept of ubuntu escapes his critique. After developing criteria for measuring the success of any philosophical concept, I conclude that ubuntu is unsuccessful. I then identify the political constraints placed on ubuntu that lead to its failure. These constraints arise from having to validate Africa as a place of intellectual worth. Considering the role of place in these constraints, I argue that a far more productive approach to ubuntu (and South African philosophy in general) is to explicitly incorporate this place into our philosophical project. I use the conceptual framework developed by Bruce Janz to provide a systematic account of place that can be used in formulating South African philosophy. I add to Janz, arguing that philosophy is a response to a particular feature of place: the mystery. By incorporating place into ubuntu, I am able to start developing a philosophical concept which can fulfil the political constraints placed on ubuntu without sacrificing its philosophical integrity. I suggest that ubuntu remains an interesting concept primarily because it promises to respond to the fragmentation of the South African place. I conclude by arguing that ubuntu should be used as the basis for a civic religion which responds to the fragmentation of the South African place. This civic religion will give rise to a significantly distinct philosophical tradition which should not succumb to Mbembe’s critique.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2014
Reconciling Western and African philosophy : rationality, culture and communitarianism
- Authors: Vitsha, Xolisa
- Date: 2002
- Subjects: Philosophy, African , Africa -- Intellectual life , Philosophy, Comparative , Philosophy , Communitarianism , Self
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2838 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003807 , Philosophy, African , Africa -- Intellectual life , Philosophy, Comparative , Philosophy , Communitarianism , Self
- Description: This thesis attempts to reconcile Western and African philosophy with specific reference to the issues of rationality, culture and communitarianism. It also discusses the post-Enlightenment, Western philosophical concept of liberal "atomism" and the primacy of the individual and the emergence of a communitarian critique in response. This thesis intends exploring how Western notions of individuality and the communitarian response can be reconciled with contemporary African philosophy and African communitarian thought in particular. To do this, it is necessary to explore the problem of liberal individualism and how African communitarianism might reinforce the Western communitarian critique. African communitarianism has a processual understanding of personhood that underpins its conception of the Self. In contrast to this view, Western communitarianism has a relational conception of the individual Self. Thus, this thesis argues that African communitarianism has a more profound understanding of the constitution of the Self. To demonstrate these claims, this study discusses notions of rationality which inform each of the philosophical traditions. This will enable a comparative analysis of the above-mentioned philosophical traditions with the intention of uncovering the concepts that provide the platform for their reconciliation.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2002
- Authors: Vitsha, Xolisa
- Date: 2002
- Subjects: Philosophy, African , Africa -- Intellectual life , Philosophy, Comparative , Philosophy , Communitarianism , Self
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2838 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003807 , Philosophy, African , Africa -- Intellectual life , Philosophy, Comparative , Philosophy , Communitarianism , Self
- Description: This thesis attempts to reconcile Western and African philosophy with specific reference to the issues of rationality, culture and communitarianism. It also discusses the post-Enlightenment, Western philosophical concept of liberal "atomism" and the primacy of the individual and the emergence of a communitarian critique in response. This thesis intends exploring how Western notions of individuality and the communitarian response can be reconciled with contemporary African philosophy and African communitarian thought in particular. To do this, it is necessary to explore the problem of liberal individualism and how African communitarianism might reinforce the Western communitarian critique. African communitarianism has a processual understanding of personhood that underpins its conception of the Self. In contrast to this view, Western communitarianism has a relational conception of the individual Self. Thus, this thesis argues that African communitarianism has a more profound understanding of the constitution of the Self. To demonstrate these claims, this study discusses notions of rationality which inform each of the philosophical traditions. This will enable a comparative analysis of the above-mentioned philosophical traditions with the intention of uncovering the concepts that provide the platform for their reconciliation.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2002
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